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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
LAMONE V. CAPOZZI: THE EARLY VOTING STATUTES 
PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTION 
AND, AS A RESULT, MUST BE DECLARED VOID. 
By: Joseph Lane 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the early voting 
statutes passed by the General Assembly of Maryland are inconsistent 
with Maryland's Constitution and, as a result, must be declared void. 
Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53,912 A.2d 674 (2006). In so holding, 
the Court found that the acts were in derogation of the Maryland 
Constitution because they allowed voting on days other than the single 
day on which all general elections must be held and allowed voting in 
districts in which the voter does not reside. Id. 
This case stems from the early voting statute ("act") passed during 
the 2006 session of the General Assembly as House Bill 1368 (2006), 
Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006. The original bill, laying out the 
early voting plan, was passed on January 16,2006. On AprillO, 2006, 
both houses of the General Assembly overrode a veto by the 
Governor. The bill allowed early voting "eight hours each day for a 
five-day period beginning the Tuesday before a primary or general 
election through the Saturday before the election day, at [at least three] 
sites designated by the local board of elections as early voting sites." 
The bill was further amended to allow early voting for eleven, rather 
than eight, hours each day in every Maryland county and Baltimore 
City. 
On July 16, 2006, three registered voters in Queen Anne's County, 
Marirose Joan Capozzi, Bettye B. Speed, and Charles W. Carter, 
brought suit in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the State, the State Board of 
Elections, and its administrator, Linda H. Lamone. Their claim 
alleged that the act conflicted with Article I, section 1; Article XV, 
section 7; and Article XVII, sections 1 and 2 of the Maryland 
Constitution. The case was subsequently transferred to the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County where, after a denial of motions from 
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each party, the court issued its Memorandum Opinion on August 8, 
2006, holding that the act was unconstitutional and void. The circuit 
court enjoined the State from utilizing the early voting scheme, at 
which time Lamone appealed the decision and petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
The Court applied a well settled principle of constitutional 
interpretation in coming to its conclusion. Capozzi, 396 Md. at 72, 
912 A.2d at 685. In determining the meaning of the constitutional 
provision, the Court used a plain language interpretation. Id. In doing 
so, the Court assessed whether the statute passed by the General 
Assembly was in derogation of the Constitution. Id. Lamone argued 
that Article III, section 9 of the Maryland Constitution, which states 
that, "[t]he General Assembly shall have power to regulate by Law, 
not inconsistent with this Constitution, all matters which related to the 
Judges of election, time, place and manner of holding elections in this 
State" gives them the power to enforce this early voting scheme. 
Capozzi, 396 Md. at 73, 912 A.2d at 686 (quoting MD. CONST. art. III, 
§ 9). The Court, however, found that the opposite was true and that 
the General Assembly was barred from creating any legislation that 
was not in keeping with the plain meaning of the Constitution. 
Capozzi, 396 Md. at 75-76,912 A.2d at 687. 
First, the Court found the early voting act unconstitutional because 
by allowing voting for five days before the designated election day, 
the act was "clearly inconsistent with the words of, and the plain 
meaning of Article XV, section 7 and the other constitutional 
provisions that designate the 'Tuesday next after the first Monday of 
November' as the date of the general election." Capozzi, 396 Md. at 
76, 912 A.2d at 687 (quoting MD. CON ST. art. XV, § 7). Lamone 
argued that there was no inconsistency because the word "election" 
does not refer to the singular act of casting a ballot, but rather refers to 
the combined and drawn out actions of voters and officials to select an 
office holder over numerous days or weeks. Id. at 76-77,912 A.2d at 
687 (citing Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997)). The Court was not 
persuaded by this argument and held that despite Lamone's argument, 
voting was prohibited on any day other than the one specified in the 
State Constitution. Capozzi, 396 Md. at 77-78, 912 A.2d at 688. 
In support of her position, Lamone cited Voting Integrity Project, 
Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2000), and Millsaps v. 
Thompson, 259 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001), in which the courts found 
that early voting schemes did not violate existing federal law. 
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Capozzi, 396 Md. at 78-84,912 A.2d at 688-92. The Court, however, 
decided that neither holding favored appellant's argument 
distinguishing those cases as applying to federal laws rather than an 
analysis of state constitutionality. /d. at 82-83, 912 A.2d at 691. 
Another reason why the Court invalidated the early voting act as 
unconstitutional was because it permitted people to vote outside of 
their residential wards, even going so far as to "provide for three 
different early voting polling places in some counties." [d. at 84, 912 
A.2d at 692. Significantly, Article I, section 1 of the Maryland 
Constitution bars voting in an election district or ward in which one 
does not reside. Capozzi, 396 Md. at 84-85, 912 A.2d at 692. In 
support of its reasoning, the Court quotes the Maryland case of Kemp 
v. Owens, which held that one '''cannot lawfully vote in a ward or 
election district in which he does not reside. '" Capozzi, 396 Md. at 
67,912 A.2d at 693 (quoting Owens, 76 Md. 235, 238, 24 A. 606,607 
(1982». Thus, allowing voters to vote outside of their constitutionally 
demarcated ward or election district was clearly at odds with the 
Maryland Constitution and specifically barred by relevant case law. 
/d. at 87-88, 912 A.2d at 694. 
The Court further rebutted the appellants' contention that Article 1, 
section 1 of the Maryland Constitution did not apply to primary 
elections. Capozzi, 396 Md. at 88, 912 A.2d at 694. Appellants 
contended that the holdings of two Maryland cases, Hill v. Mayor & 
Town Council of Colmar Manor, 210 Md. 46, 122 A.2d 462 (1956), 
and Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Blunt, 200 Md. 120, 88 A.2d 
474 (1952) gave the General Assembly the complete right to control 
primary and municipal elections in Maryland. Capozzi, 396 Md. at 88, 
912 A.2d at 694. This Court held that neither case resulted in such a 
holding, and quoted the circuit court's ruling that '''such a reading 
could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional 
qualifications for primary elections.'" Capozzi, 396 Md. at 89, 912 
A.2d at 695. 
Finally, the Court held that early voting was not authorized under 
the in-person balloting provision in Article I, section 3 of the 
Maryland Constitution which provides an avenue for citizens who are 
"unable to vote personally" or are "absent" at the time of an election. 
Capozzi, 396 Md. at 90,912 A.2d at 695. This provision applied only 
to those individuals who cannot vote due to unchangeable 
circumstances, not to those who merely find voting "inconvenient" on 
the allocated date. /d. at 90-91, 912 A.2d at 695-96. Thus, the 
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exception is wholly inapplicable to the early voting act. Id. at 91-92, 
912 A.3d at 696. 
In this case, the Court invalidated the early voting act as 
unconstitutional because it was in derogation of the clear meaning of 
the Maryland Constitution, and was not supported by Article I, section 
3. This decision will undoubtedly have significant effects on 
Maryland politicians, practitioners, and voters. For politicians, the 
invalidation of the Act could work to the advantage of candidates 
whose constituents are employed at jobs from which they are able to 
go to the voting booths on Election Day. Those residents who work 
long, strict hours may be unable to vote. For practitioners, this case 
serves as an indicator of how the current Court will strictly construe 
any provisions of the Maryland Constitution. 
